Factors Influencing Revenue Collection for Preventative Maintenance of Community Water Systems: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative Comparative Analysis by Olaerts, Liesbet et al.
Digital Commons @ George Fox University 
Faculty Publications - Biomedical, Mechanical, 
and Civil Engineering 
Department of Biomedical, Mechanical, and 
Civil Engineering 
7-8-2019 
Factors Influencing Revenue Collection for Preventative 
Maintenance of Community Water Systems: A Fuzzy-Set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis 
Liesbet Olaerts 
Jeffrey P. Walters 
George Fox University, jwalters@georgefox.edu 
Karl G. Linden 
University of Colorado Boulder 
Amy Javernick-Will 
University of Colorado Boulder 
Adam Harvey 
Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/mece_fac 
 Part of the Development Studies Commons, and the Operations Research, Systems Engineering and 
Industrial Engineering Commons 
Recommended Citation 
Olaerts, Liesbet; Walters, Jeffrey P.; Linden, Karl G.; Javernick-Will, Amy; and Harvey, Adam, "Factors 
Influencing Revenue Collection for Preventative Maintenance of Community Water Systems: A Fuzzy-Set 
Qualitative Comparative Analysis" (2019). Faculty Publications - Biomedical, Mechanical, and Civil 
Engineering. 91. 
https://digitalcommons.georgefox.edu/mece_fac/91 
This Article is brought to you for free and open access by the Department of Biomedical, Mechanical, and Civil 
Engineering at Digital Commons @ George Fox University. It has been accepted for inclusion in Faculty Publications 
- Biomedical, Mechanical, and Civil Engineering by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ George Fox 
University. For more information, please contact arolfe@georgefox.edu. 
sustainability
Article
Factors Influencing Revenue Collection for
Preventative Maintenance of Community Water
Systems: A Fuzzy-Set Qualitative
Comparative Analysis
Liesbet Olaerts 1, Jeffrey P. Walters 2,* , Karl G. Linden 3 , Amy Javernick-Will 3
and Adam Harvey 4
1 Self Help Enterprises, Visalia, CA 93291, USA
2 Department of Civil Engineering, College of Engineering, George Fox University, Newberg, OR 97132, USA
3 Department of Civil, Environmental, and Architectural Engineering, University of Colorado Boulder,
Boulder, CO 80309, USA
4 Whave, Kampala 72305, Uganda
* Correspondence: jwalters@georgefox.edu; Tel.: +1-971-412-8572
Received: 28 May 2019; Accepted: 4 July 2019; Published: 8 July 2019
Abstract: This study analyzed combinations of conditions that influence regular payments for
water service in resource-limited communities. To do so, the study investigated 16 communities
participating in a new preventive maintenance program in the Kamuli District of Uganda under
a public–private partnership framework. First, this study identified conditions posited as important
for collective payment compliance from a literature review. Then, drawing from data included in
a water source report and by conducting semi-structured interviews with households and water
user committees (WUC), we identified communities that were compliant with, or suspended from,
preventative maintenance service payments. Through qualitative analyses of these data and case
knowledge, we identified and characterized conditions that appeared to contribute to these outcomes.
Then, we employed fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA) to determine the combinations
of conditions that led to payment compliance. Overall, the findings from this study reveal distinct
pathways of conditions that impact payment compliance and reflect the multifaceted nature of water
point sustainability. Practically, the findings identify the processes needed for successful payment
compliance, which include a strong WUC with proper support and training, user perceptions that the
water quality is high and available in adequate quantities, ongoing support, and a lack of nearby
water sources. A comprehensive understanding of the combined factors that lead to payment
compliance can improve future preventative maintenance programs, guide the design of water service
arrangements, and ultimately increase water service sustainability.
Keywords: sustainable water services; water payments; preventative maintenance;
fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis
1. Introduction
Universal and reliable water service delivery is an important goal in sustainable development.
However, the practical application of and methodologies for providing sustained water services in
resource-limited communities vary greatly between regions and remains an enduring challenge for
governments, communities, and institutions.
The UN declared the period between 1981 and 1990 as the Decade of Water. A consequence of
this declaration was the widespread installation of water service infrastructure, particularly hand
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pumps, to increase water access in rural developing communities around the world. Since then,
community-based management (CBM) of hand pumps has been the mainstay techno-institutional
approach to rural water point development [1,2]. In CBM systems, water users are the key actors of
water provision; communities have the responsibility and authority to financially manage, operate,
and maintain their water facilities [3]. The CBM model has been promoted and promulgated broadly
in rural areas across sub-Saharan Africa, mainly in response to the acknowledged failure of top-down,
state-led approaches for water provision in these areas [1,4,5]. However, in the decades that followed,
flaws in this techno-institutional coupling have also become apparent [6–9], with an estimated 10–65%
of hand pumps nonfunctional at any one time [10].
There have been numerous studies to understand what conditions are most influential for the
sustainability of rural water supplies. These studies identified similar conditions that influenced the
sustainability of rural water service delivery, despite differences in methodology and geographical
context. In particular, revenue collection from water users has been shown to be a well-established
cornerstone of a strong water system management scheme [2,3], and is widely regarded as critical
to sustainability [1,11–17].
However, recent studies point toward the inability of water user committees (WUCs) to mobilize
resources for the operations and maintenance (O&M) of water systems. Specifically, a study by Carter
et al. [18], which analyzed data from 92,594 water points fitted with hand pumps across five countries,
found that three in five water points were not accompanied by any form of revenue collection, and only
one in five water user groups regularly collected and saved funds in advance of a breakdown. Further,
even where arrangements were put in place to regularly collect fees, a sizable proportion of water
point users failed to meet their payment obligations [11,18].
As the challenges of CBM schemes become more apparent and documented (e.g., [19–21]),
a preventive maintenance (PM) framework, which merges the professionalization and technical
responsibilities of a public–private partnership (PPP) with performance-based contracts, has been
viewed as a promising tool for achieving performance and financial sustainability of water services [22].
An active engagement of the private sector with governments, communities, and investors can
potentially harness market incentives to improve service delivery, leverage institutional and
governmental support to private capital for investment costs, and increase accountability of WUCs [22].
In addition, the importance of and decision-making for water user payment structures is a central
part of financial sustainability, community management, and participatory planning; yet government
engagement in payment formulation is generally less pronounced [20]. Policies are commonly agnostic
about the revenue collection approach, and the ones that venture into the realm of rural water user
tariffs find little consensus about preferred payment models [23].
While there is an established body of literature examining conditions that effect water user
payments under a CBM framework, there is a dearth of literature that evaluates if the same conditions,
or combination of conditions, also play a role in a PPP-based PM service models. This point is
particularly important considering the growing body of literature supporting the adoption of systems
approaches to water interventions, whereby the interconnected relationships between conditions are
understood and considered in the planning, development, and management of water services [24–27].
Thus, this research aims to build on prior work by empirically assessing the conditions that contribute
to successful user fee collection under a new PPP program, whereby PM services are provided to
rural communities in the Kamuli District of Uganda. We then integrate the key conditions into
a multifaceted approach that recognizes and evaluates their intrinsic interrelatedness by employing
fuzzy-set Qualitative Comparative Analysis (fsQCA).
2. Materials and Methods
In this study, we use an integrated approach to investigate the conditions present within
communities that motivate or hinder successful payment compliance. We recognize that these
conditions rarely operate in isolation, and instead affect, and are affected by, one another; therefore,
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we employ qualitative comparative analysis (QCA) to better understand the multifaceted pathways
that lead to success or failure in collective payment. For this paper in particular, successful collective
payment is when a community pays the required annual fee in exchange for PM services and is
‘compliant’ with their PM service agreement.
Recently, QCA has seen increasing application within the international water and sanitation
sector research to reveal and characterize the complex drivers of water and sanitation service
delivery outcomes, including water and sanitation in schools [28,29], water points [9], sanitation
infrastructure [30], and overall service sustainability [31–33]. QCA is particularly useful for describing
complex causal relationships by analyzing the ways in which conditions combine together to yield
an outcome, rather than quantifying the effects of independent variables [34–36]. QCA retains the
power of rich, in-depth knowledge of cases, while providing more generalizable results from the
analysis [37]. QCA is particularly well suited to intermediate sample sizes that fall between the small
sample size of traditional case studies and the large sample size of statistical analyses [37]. Issues of
validity are addressed through strong case orientation [38]. Cases are purposively selected to allow
for modest generalization, or external validity, and in-depth case knowledge helps ensure internal
validity, both in selecting conditions, assigning values for cases, and in interpreting the results [39].
Through qualitative and quantitative data, QCA identifies causal pathways of conditions that lead to
a specific outcome of interest [38]. Conditions are factors identified from theory or case knowledge
that are hypothesized to influence an outcome of interest, whereas pathways are the combinations of
causal conditions that together lead to an outcome of interest.
Within this study, we used fuzzy-set qualitative comparative analysis (fsQCA). fsQCA can be used
when finer gradations in the dataset are present and significant, where each variable is assigned a value
along a range between 0 and 1. Because of the nuanced nature of the conditions influencing payment
compliance, fsQCA was selected over other forms of QCA that focus on categorical variables (crisp-set
and multi-value QCA) [40,41]. Figure 1 illustrates the fsQCA process used in this study to assess
the conditions and causal pathways for successful community payment compliance. This process
is based on steps described by Kaminsky and Jordan [42] for the application of QCA for water,
sanitation and hygiene (WASH) research as illustrated in Figure 1. Although shown in a linear
progression, employing fsQCA is an iterative process informed by a thoughtful interpretation of model
outputs. We discuss the fsQCA process below in more detail.
Figure 1. Research process overview (modified from Kaminsky and Jordan [42]).
2.1. Study Context and Sample Set
Uganda has an estimated population of 37.8 million, of which 85% resides in rural areas [43].
Poverty remains firmly entrenched in rural areas, where remote rural communities and smallholder
farmers face significant challenges for sustainable water supply. A study assessing the effectiveness
of CBM rural water supply facilities reported that only 53% of the sources were found to be fully
functional [13]. The rest of the facilities were either broken down or abandoned, while others only
provided water intermittently [13].
Our study analyzed a new PM program in the Kamuli District of Uganda run by a Ugandan
nonprofit social enterprise, Whave, hereafter called ‘PM service provider.’ The PM program was
implemented in five districts in Uganda. As part of the PM program, the PM service provider currently
conducts regular water analyses to monitor water quality and provides PM year-round to ensure
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functionality of water sources. In most cases, the service provider, with support from communities and
external partners such as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) or local governments, rehabilitates the
water source as a first step in signing up a PM service agreement. Subsequently, all minor and major
parts replacements are covered by the service agreement and service fee. In cases where the water
issues are extreme, or the action required falls beyond the service provider’s service scope (i.e., silting of
the borehole, construction of a new water source), the community receives guidance on alternative
options such as where and how to obtain necessary funding.
At the time of our study, local entrepreneurs would collect WUC fee payments every six months
to a year and would not be involved with the collection of household payments. As stated in the PPP
contract, the WUC was responsible for water payment collection at the household (water user) level.
Lacking a more formal guidance or framework, payment modalities of households varied greatly
from community to community. Payment modalities of households, including frequency and price,
were defined by each WUC. In most cases, WUC would start by collecting household payments on
a monthly basis. As the WUCs participating in the study began experiencing challenges in collecting
household payments, the frequency and price of payments tended to change with time. To address
these challenges, communities would try different strategies, such as lowering the household fee,
locking the pump, and changing payment collection times to quarterly, after the harvest period,
or during the dry season.
Because the financial viability of the model is largely based on water user tariffs,
community engagement in service agreements (i.e., the community is willing to sign a PM agreement,
attend and participate in meetings, and be involved with activities related to PM service) is a key
component to improve financial sustainability and scale the model. This is especially important
considering that, of 120 contracts signed in the Kamuli District in 2017, 20.8% are currently suspended
and 10% are on warning of suspension due to payment noncompliance [44].
To optimize the potential for fsQCA analyses to produce meaningful insights regarding the
drivers of payment compliance, study cases (communities) were selected based on variability between
payment compliance outcomes and associated causal conditions. [34,39]. To guide the selection of the
communities, we evaluated data provided by the water source baseline assessment conducted by the
PM service provider [44].
The primary criteria for case selection was compliance with the PM service agreement.
A community was considered ‘compliant’ when they paid an annual fee in exchange for PM service,
and ‘suspended’ when they failed to pay for services. Sixteen community cases were selected;
eight were compliant, and eight were suspended. Each selected community had one hand pump
facility and varied in terms of number of households being served by the water point, hand pump
depth, and an external implementing organization. Community cases were selected from rural areas
of two sub-counties in the Kamuli District of Uganda representing different compliance rates: Bulopa
and Wankole. In both sub-counties, between 31 and 42% of the hand pumps were under a preventive
maintenance service agreement (PMSA) with the PM service provider. Bulopa had an overall high
compliance rate (80% of the PMSAs are compliant), whereas Wankole, one of the PM service provider’s
first sub-counties in Kamuli, had about half that compliance rate (only 44% of the PMSAs signed are
still compliant).
Each selected community had one hand pump facility and varied in terms of number of households
being served by the water point, hand pump depth, and implementing organizations. All communities
were difficult to access and lacked access to basic infrastructure such as roads, vehicles, and adequate
sanitation. Most families in these communities live below the poverty line on subsistence agriculture,
with some families building bricks to sell in nearby bigger communities. Illiteracy is high and most
families do not have proper housing facilities and lack access to health care and other social services.
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2.2. Conditions and Outcomes
An initial list of conditions impacting payment compliance was created from the literature
(see Supplementary Table S1, for the definitions of conditions and citations). For example, the literature
showed (e.g., [45]; Terry et al. [46]) that the lack of training programs (condition WUC Ongoing Training
and Support) can result in poor management and disorganized WUC, which in turn would lead to
water users’ mistrust and reduced willingness to contribute with water payments. Another condition
identified was Alternative Improved Water Sources, whereby the literature showed that existence of
alternative water sources reduces community members’ willingness to pay for water from protected
sources [12,17,47–49]. These conditions, and the other listed in Table S1, were used to develop the
interview questions.
2.3. Data Collection
Data were collected to characterize each condition and system outcomes in each of the sixteen cases
through interviews, documentation, and observations. Interviews were conducted with water users,
and WUC members and ranged in duration from 45 minutes to one hour. Interviews had a mix of close-
and open-ended questions adapted for water users and WUC members. Interview questions were
guided by conditions identified in the literature and worded to explore deeper context-specific aspects
of these conditions. For example, one question asked “Did the WUC have access to any type of training
(condition WUC Training and Support)?” and then asked open-ended follow-up questions to describe
nuanced elements of each condition such as, “If yes, what type of training?”. The interview scripts can
be found in Table S2. Interviews were collected with a local translator. A total of 40 interviews were
conducted; 18 interviews with WUC members and 22 interviews with households.
Available documentation was collected in order to triangulate data from interviews. One such
document was a water source baseline assessment report developed by the PM service provider
in 2017 [44]. The baseline water source report yielded important information such as water source
performance, functionality, and maintenance status. We also took field observations in each community
to evaluate the water source condition, functionality, performance, and cleanness of the surrounding
area, which could reflect proper use or misuse. For example, to evaluate if the WUC was taking
responsibility of the water source, we assessed the general condition of the water source, the drainage
channel, and the surrounding area. The general functionality and performance of the water source
was also assessed by evaluating the condition of the pump handle and conducting a simple stroke and
leakage test [1].
All data collection procedures were in accordance with our IRB-approved protocol (University of
Colorado Boulder IRB #18-0063).
2.4. Analysis of Conditions and Outcomes
To process information on conditions, the data gathered, including interview data, documentation,
and field notes, were imported into QSR NVivo [50] and coded. Coding is a process where qualitative
data is categorized based on important themes of interest, called codes [51]. Qualitative data were
coded using deductive and inductive methods [52]. Deductive coding was based upon the conditions
identified from the literature review, whereas inductive coding allowed nuanced themes to emerge
from the data. In this study, we had one condition emerge: previous breakdowns and funds misusage
experience (BreakDown). From our interviews, we found that a prior negative experience with
breakdown may lead community members to be more willing to pay for PM services.
We eliminated four conditions in our study. Due to the need for variation in our collected data,
we eliminated two conditions that did not vary, called domain conditions in QCA. For example,
a greater representation of women in WUC was hypothesized to be a major influence on payment
compliance. However, because this condition did not vary across our cases, the condition ‘women
representation in WUC’ was not included in the fsQCA. Similarly, ‘reliable maintenance service’ was
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a domain condition not included in the study. We eliminated two other conditions—rainfall pattern
and productive water use—as there was a lack of information to assess differences between cases.
Lastly, as it is common practice in an intermediate N analysis (between 10 and 40 cases) to select
from four to seven conditions [53], we further distilled down the list to only include six conditions
in the fsQCA. To do this, we affinity-grouped conditions that were correlated or could be combined.
For example, the condition WUC organization (WUCorg) aggregated three main organizational aspects
of WUC observed on the ground: degree of responsibility, existence of conflicts, and degree of legitimacy
of WUC, which analyzed whether the WUC had a constitution, was legally registered at the sub-county
government, and had a bank account. Table S1 shows how initial conditions were aggregated.
Thus, the six conditions included in the fsQCA were: previous experience with breakdown
and funds misusage (BreakDown); alternative improved water sources (AltSource); water quality
and availability perception (WatAvail&Qual); WUC organization (WUCorg); ongoing support and
communication (Supp&Com); and, perception about water payment (PayPerception). These conditions
are also reflective of the findings from a number of key studies that analyzed factors influential to
collective payment [1,12,17,20,47] and are cited as being significant in water user payment compliance.
Table 1 shows the selected list of conditions that were analyzed for association with payment compliance
in fsQCA with their respective definition and source.
Table 1. Hypothesized causal conditions that influence payment compliance used for QCA.
Hypothesized Causal
Condition Definition Citation/Source
Water Availability and Quality
perception
(WatAvail&Qual)
Community members experience
reliable water supply and perceived
their water of good quality.
Foster and Hope (2016)
Kativhu et al. (2017)
Alternative Improved Water
Sources
(AltSources)
Community members have access to
other nearby improved sources that
are functioning, cheaper, or for free.
Broek and Brown (2015)
Koehler et al. (2015)
Foster and Hope (2016)
Whittington et al. (2009)
Previous breakdowns and
funds misusage experience
(Breakdown)
A community’s prior exposure to
breakdowns of hand pumps and
misusage of funds and the impact on
community trust.
Case Knowledge
WUC Organization
(WUCorg)
WUC takes active responsibility for
water source with no significant WUC
conflict; WUC has legal status and
authority to perform their task.
Broek and Brown (2015)
Harvey et al. (2006)
Kamruzzaman et al. (2013)
Madrigal et al. (2011)
Kwangare et al. (2014)
Ongoing Support &
Communication
(Supp&Comm)
There is an overall understanding
about the PM model with no
significant miscommunication. WUC
members feel that they have technical
and managerial support for ongoing
O&M.
Quin et al. (2011)
Terry et al. (2015)
Case knowledge
Perception about Water
Payments
(PayPerception)
The general belief among people that
water should be free of charge, and/or
expectation that payments should be
collected only when the hand pump is
broken.
Broek and Brown (2015)
Foster and Hope (2017)
Whittington et al. (2009)
Lastly, the outcome condition—Successful Payment Compliance—was identified using an aggregated
score of payment compliance status, community struggle to achieve compliance, and WUC member’s
knowledge about their status. In particular, a fuzzy-set score was developed to reflect four distinct
service outcomes observed in the field: (i) the PM agreement was suspended, that is, the community
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was noncompliant with payments (0: fully outside the set); (ii) the PM agreement was suspended,
however, WUC members are not aware of the suspension (0.33: partially outside the set); (iii) the PM
agreement was compliant, however, the community was struggling to be compliant with payments
(0.66: partially in the set); and lastly, (iv) the PM agreement was compliant and the community
wanted to sign the service agreement again (1: fully in the set). Evaluation of WUC awareness of
suspension was based on Question 41 from the interview script (Table S2, Q41: “why the agreement is
on warning/suspend?”), whereby the interviewee’s indication of compliance in the event that services
had been suspended signaled a lack of awareness. Evaluation of compliance struggles was evaluated
through discussion with the PM service provider regarding challenges faced by communities to achieve
payment compliance.
2.5. Condition Calibration
Based upon the data collected and our case knowledge, we calibrated conditions and outcomes
as values between 0, fully out of the set, to 1, fully in the set. Calibration scores and definitions,
similar to rubrics, are created for validity when performing cross-comparisons. Intermediate scores
between 0 and 1 were determined qualitatively based on a set membership approach and “anchor
points.” Anchor points represent partial-set membership (whether in or out) cutoff points derived from
theoretical and case knowledge to reflect meaningful separations between cases. These distinctions
often resulted in fuzzy-set scores of: 0 (fully outside the set), 0.33 (partially outside the set), 0.67 (partially
in the set), or 1 (fully in the set).
Table 2 shows an example for WUCorg calibration table. Table S3 shows the calibration scores and
definitions for each condition and outcome.
Table 2. Calibration for WUC Organization.
Fuzzy-Score Definition
0 Out-of-set. No active WUC.
0.33
Partially out-of-set. WUC takes minimal responsibility with occasional
lapses in management or is unorganized, has intra-WUC conflicts,
and WUC members provide contradictory information.
0.67
Partially in-set. WUC takes responsibility for water source with no
significant WUC conflict, WUC has a constitution, and collects
payments records but is not legally registered nor has a bank account
1
In-set. WUC takes active responsibility for water source with no
significant WUC conflict, is legally registered, has a bank account,
and collects payments records.
Each condition, as well as the outcome, was calibrated using a similar process. Fuzzy scores for all
conditions and outcomes were then assigned for every case and summarized in a truth table. The truth
table, listing scores for each condition and outcome by case, is shown in Table S4.
2.6. Data Analysis with fsQCA
The fsQCA software [54] was used to analyze the truth table and identify pathways to successful
payment compliance. We employed the intermediate solution set, as it permitted the integration of
counterfactuals and case knowledge to simplify and strengthen the assumptions about whether the
presence or absence of conditions would lead to case outcomes [42]. We assumed that the presence
of conditions would influence compliance (success) and the absence of conditions would influence
noncompliance (failure). Exceptions included AltSources and PayPerception, where the presence
of these conditions were hypothesized to influence failure and the absence were hypothesized to
influence success.
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The solution pathways leading to payment compliance were evaluated for level of significance
using consistency and coverage metrics. Consistency measures the degree (between 0 and 1) to which
cases sharing the same causal pathway solution have the same outcome; in our case, how consistently
a pathway leads to payment compliance. Coverage, on the other hand, is the percent of cases (between
0 and 1) with an outcome that are explained by a given pathway. For the purposes of this research,
significance of a pathway solution was based on a consistency value of 0.8, which is a best practice for
fsQCA analysis [53].
Another commonly used metric is to examine the “necessity” (also measured between 0 and 1) of
individual conditions in leading to each outcome of interest. The calculation for necessity is shown in
Equation (1), where Xi is the membership score for a given combination of conditions and Yi is the
outcome score for that combination [55]. A condition is necessary when all (or nearly all) instances of
the outcome show the condition. Necessity scores above 0.9 are generally required for a condition to
be considered necessary [34].
Necessity =
∑
min(XiYi)∑
Yi
(1)
3. Results and Discussion
This section discusses the study findings evaluating the 16 cases using coding strategies and
fsQCA. First, the condition pathways that lead to PM service compliance in Kamuli obtained through
fsQCA are examined. Second, we discuss the key implications for implementing PM schemes within
the larger water sector.
3.1. Pathways to Payment Compliance
We found three pathways to success, shown in Figure 2, which had a solution set consistency
of 0.952 and coverage of 0.835. These results present three compelling observations: 1) WUCorg and
WatAvailQual appear in all the pathways; 2) two conditions (BreakDown and AltSources) appear to
influence user’s payment perception (PayPerception); and, 3) BreakDown and the lack of AltSources
appear to have a ‘neutralizing’ effect, where the existence of one negates influence of the other on
payment compliance. These observations are described below.
Figure 2. Pathways to successful payment compliance. Note: ‘*’ means ‘and,’ ‘~’ means ‘absent,’
and lines represent distinctions between separate pathways.
3.2. Observation 1: WUCorg & WatAvailQual are Critical for Payment Compliance
Our findings suggest that, for a community to be compliant with payments, it is necessary that
users perceive that their water is of good quality and available in adequate quantities (WatAvailQual),
while having a well-organized and active WUC (WUCorg). These two conditions appeared in all
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pathways and the necessity scores for each was higher than 0.9, which is the criteria for a condition to
be considered necessary [34].
While some failed cases could also have adequate available water and offer perceived good quality,
the condition (WatAvail&Qual) appears necessary for successful cases. Six out of eight noncompliant
cases had issues with WatAvailQual, forcing water users to search for alternative sources. As one WUC
member mentioned, “After pumping a lot the water reduces, especially during the dry seasons. When that
happens, we wait until the water comes back or go to the open pond.” Conversely, a WUC member from
a compliant case points to WatAvailQual as an important driver of community satisfaction with the
water service:
“ . . . completely satisfied with the services because before (the PM service provider’s program) the hand
pump was in bad conditions, breaking all the time, and the water would change color. Now the hand pump is
working well and (the PM service provider) helped to rehabilitate the hand pump and solve the water color issue.”
Similarly, the WUC’s role and ability to organize (WUCorg) was necessary for payment compliance
under the PM model. We verified that, in the same way that poor WUC organization can negatively
impact payment compliance, a well-organized WUC can absolve many otherwise confounding issues
in a community. For example, although collecting water payments was an important challenge for all
cases, a well-organized WUC could conceivably address these barriers with the resources they have
or provide a feasible plan to overcome them. An interesting comment from a water user reflects the
positive experience users have with a well-structured and organized WUC:
“The WUC mobilize the community for meetings and hygiene issues. We can follow where the money goes,
so that gives us trust. Because WUC do meetings to report on the money issues, people talk about that and we
trust what people are saying.”
More compelling is the apparent interconnectivity between multiple conditions,
namely WatAvail&Qual, WUCorg, and the conditions Supp&Com and PayPerception, found in different
pathways of the fsQCA model. Our findings clearly show that successful compliance cases had
the presence of perceived quality, reliable and plentiful water service provision (WatAvail&Qual),
and a well-organized WUC (WUCorg). Progressing further down the pathways offers more nuanced
insights. Four out of five cases with low scores for WUCorg also received low scores for Supp&Com
(community understanding and communication related to PM models) and PayPerception (user opinion
that water should be free). These four cases received a low score for these two conditions due to the
existence of: (i) significant intra-WUC conflicts; (ii) critical miscommunication between WUC, water
users, and service provider; and, (iii) a widespread belief among users that water should be free of
charge or the expectation that payments should be collected only when the hand pump is broken
(PayPerception). In one case, a community had a pump that had been broken for weeks due to misuse
and disrepair, with no action made to resolve the issue. A WUC member in this community commented:
“ . . . Our main problem is that the WUC is not united, mostly because the WUC chairperson is not
cooperative. He wanted to give water for free and not collect water fees. I am trying to collect water fees, but is
difficult because as there are some conflicts, people don’t want to pay anymore.”
We posit from these findings that the lack of a well-organized WUC (WUCorg) leads to
miscommunication and lack of understanding among users about how their water source is managed
(Supp&Com). The conflicts and misunderstandings further resulted in mistrust and low willingness
to pay for water, reinforcing the general belief among users that water should be free of charge or
that revenues should be collected only when the source is broken (PayPerception). Indeed, water users
mistrusting WUCs due to fear of mismanagement of funds is a well-documented condition within
literature [1,22,56].
Overall, these results align with previous studies correlating water quality and users’ willingness to
pay for water [47,49,57], and studies assessing CBM performance that make reference to the importance
of an active and well-organized WUC to promote service sustainability [1,17,57]. Our findings
highlight the importance of these same user committees for PM model success under a PPP framework.
They also elucidate and operationalize interlinkages between WUCorg, Supp&Com, and PayPerception,
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reinforcing the need to build capacity among WUC around subjects such as payment perception,
communication strategies, and conflict resolution skills. This is especially important considering
that the condition Supp&Com was present in two of the three pathways for payment compliance,
with a consistency score of 0.835.
3.3. Observation 2: BreakDown and AltSources Appear to Influence PayPerception
The two pathways that share PayPerception are preceded by two conditions that appear to
contribute to water users’ positive perception of payment, namely: (i) the presence of BreakDown,
a community’s prior exposure to continuous breakdowns and misusage of funds; and, (ii) the absence
of AltSources, cases in which community members lack alternative improved water sources. Within our
cases, both conditions (presence of BreakDown and absence of AltSources) contribute to water users’
understanding of the benefits of regular payments for PM, where users value a continued functionality
of their improved water sources and a water service structure with more accountability and transparency.
A comment from a water user reflects the change experience by the community with a well-established
PM service: “There is a big difference. Before [the PM program] the hand pump was in bad condition, breaking all
the time, and the water would change color. Now the hand pump is working well and [the PM program]
helped to rehabilitate the hand pump.” A quote from another water user points to the importance of
a well-functioning water service being the primary water source: “ . . . because our hand pump is our only
source of water, it is not difficult for the WUC to take care of the hand pump and it is very important for us to fix
any problem very fast.”
The first pathway WatAvail&Qual * WUCorg * BreakDown * ~PayPerception reflects how the PM
framework is contributing to users’ understanding of regular payments. The ‘~’ indicates an absence
of belief that water services should be free or that fees need only be collected when a breakdown occurs.
By providing water source reliability and encouraging WUCs to obtain legal status so that they are
responsible for formal and supervised banking of tariff revenues, users overcome mistrust from past
experiences of funds misusage and poor O&M of their water sources. This, in turn, is reflected in their
payment perception and their willingness to regularly contribute to water revenues. This finding aligns
with our case knowledge as well as the study by Koehler et al. [48] that indicates that payment structures
are more likely to be accepted if service maintenance is provided reliably S [49]. This implies that a lack
of alternative water sources may result in users who value and are more willing to pay to properly
maintain their water systems, and thus, better understand the importance of regular payments.
These results align with literature that references the consequences of clustering hand pumps
in a small region as it reduces incentives for payment [49]. The existence of nearby improved water
sources poses a significant challenge to collect water revenues, especially when that access is for free.
We infer that the access to ‘free’ water reinforces the general belief from nearby users that water should
be free of charge or that payments should be collected only when the hand pump needs to be repaired.
Consequently, users have a negative perception of user fees (PayPerception) and thus fail to regularly
contribute with payments for PM services.
3.4. Observation 3: ‘Neutralizing’ Effect of BreakDown on Lack of AltSources
In addition to having water perceived to have adequate availability and perceived good quality
(WatAvail&Qual) and the WUC’s role and ability to organize (WUCorg), pathways for successful
payment compliance either had prior experience with breakdowns (BreakDown) or a lack of alternative
sources (AltSources). The presence of BreakDown and absence of AltSources within the three pathways
results in users that value and are more willing to properly maintain their water system, and thus,
better appreciate the importance of regular payments. Interestingly, our findings indicate that users
with previous negative experience of breakdowns and mistrust will continue to value and appreciate
the importance of regular payments even when having access to alternative water sources. In other
words, depending on their previous experiences with O&M of water sources, users’ value reliable
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and timely maintenance service over nearby improved water sources with intermittent functionality,
as a WUC member commented:
“ . . . while our hand pump does not break, a nearby hand pump that is not under a PM agreement breaks
all the time. Some members of that community even joined our hand pump and started to pay because our hand
pump is functioning all the time.”
While it is difficult to assess the degree of influence between each condition and outcome within
an fsQCA solution, quotes such as these from water users and WUC members perhaps suggest that
BreakDown plays a stronger role, both directly (consistency score of 0.83) and indirectly, than AltSources
on payment compliance.
3.5. Limitations and Future Work
The analysis and interpretations in this study come with several qualifications and limitations,
including the relatively small sample size of 16 nonrandomly selected cases, which limits the
generalizability of findings. First, the main limitation of this work is the reliance on member interviews,
which offer subjective perspectives. As the accuracy of fsQCA is largely dependent on the quality of the
information obtained through the translation of the interview responses, the possibility of undetected
translation errors or omitted information cannot be ruled out. However, this limitation is reduced by
triangulating our observations and document analysis with our interpretation of the findings.
Second, even though fsQCA is an established methodology that quantifies and organizes
intimate case knowledge to more generalizable findings by identifying pathways of causal conditions
to a determined outcome, no relationships can be conclusively demonstrated between variables.
For example, the study was not able to better understand the relationship and degree of influence that
WUCorg, Supp&Com, and PayPerception have on each other.
Third, important conditions previously identified in the literature as potential factors impacting
payment collection were not included in the fsQCA due to negligible variance between cases or lack of
information in each case to assess the presence or absence of a specific condition. Moreover, there may
be other unobserved sources that explain why users are able to pay for water revenues more promptly
or that influence the community’s decision to adopt a particular payment collection approach, that were
not captured in this study.
Finally, while this study focused on PM services under a PPP framework, additional research
could expand upon analysis and results by comparing and contrasting different O&M approaches and
payment collection frameworks. Indeed, analyzing and comparing how different payment structures
influence the conditions present within communities that motivate or hinder collective payment
compliance could better inform future strategy.
4. Conclusions
This study sought to investigate the combinations of conditions that influence payment compliance
in PM service delivery schemes. Through qualitative analyses of water source reports and interviews
with households and WUCs gathered from a new PM program in the Kamuli District of Uganda,
we identified and characterized conditions that appeared to contribute to communities that were
compliant with, or suspended from, PM service payments. Then, we employed fsQCA to determine
the combinations of conditions that led to payment compliance.
The persistent emergence of WUCorg and WatAvail&Qual conditions in fsQCA pathway solutions,
combined with our case knowledge, showed the importance of these conditions for achieving project
sustainability. Therefore, alongside providing water perceived to be of good quality that is available in
adequate quantities, external partners need to ensure that a strong WUC is present.
While the PM service provider’s program has several tactics to increase the chances of having
a well-organized WUC, our findings indicate a further need for stronger support programs with clear
communication. The perceived lack of training and support among participants points to a gap that
needs to be better explored and addressed. This is especially important for any O&M framework
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for rural water supply that relies on volunteer-based organizations for revenue collection. Moreover,
the potential interlinkages between WUCorg, Supp&Com, and PayPerception identified in the study
reinforce the need to build capacity among WUCs around subjects such as payment perception,
communication strategies, and conflict resolution skills. Not only is there a need to build capacity
around these skills, but the analysis also highlights the opportunity to address these other conditions
through stronger support and training programs.
Based on participants’ perceived lack of training, we believe that there is opportunity to improve the
existing PM service provider’s program by applying approaches to increase learning, behavior change,
and program outcomes arising from investments in training. To help maintain positive management
and governance practices within the WUC, it is important to introduce or encourage practices that
mitigate potential conflicts within the WUC. It is also important to guide communities through the
decision of which payment structure fits best to their context, as well as to introduce or encourage
practices that minimize the challenges of payment collection.
While our findings indicate that a strong WUC with proper support and training can improve
the likelihood of project success, it cannot solely account for payment compliance. For example,
existence of nearby improved water sources poses a significant challenge to water revenues collection,
which, in turn, calls for coordinated planning of rehabilitations and locations of new water sources.
Interestingly, our findings also indicate that users, depending on their previous experiences with O&M
of water sources, value reliable and fast maintenance service over nearby improved water sources with
intermittent functionality. The importance of this condition reflects a community’s willingness to pay
for reliable services as a way of overcoming the mistrust that stems from the misuse of funds and poor
O&M of their water system. Another interesting finding was the potential interchangeability between
BreakDown and AltSources—where the existence of the former supersedes the latter, and vice versa.
In general, these insights into important condition combinations may be helpful for external
partners, as well as for different levels of government, who provide support to communities with water
revenue collection. As future trends in rural water point management appear to be growing towards
private external support structures, and away from traditional CBM schemes, this study shows that the
challenge of mobilizing resources for O&M is not solely a problem of the CBM institutional approach,
but is also important in a PPP context. Our findings indicate that an active and organized WUC
continues to be critical to program success.
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